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Law and Lawlessness 
in a Socialist Society: 
The Potential Impact of 
Crime in East Germany 
STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
R egime stability is a function of numerous factors: the extent to which citizen expectations are satisfied, popular identifica-
tion with the system, and acceptance of governmental legitimacy 
are but a few of the most obvious. Compliance with laws is yet 
another component in the catalogue of indicators of regime stabil-
ity. Since most facets of modern society are founded on some legal 
provision, compliance or noncompliance with the law as well as of-
ficial reactions to lawlessness are important factors in evaluating 
the stability of a political order. 
The significance of law violations is dependent on the nature of 
the laws being violated. Offenses relating directly to national 
security, for example, are different from those against public 
order. Western legal conceptions are based on the proposition that 
some offenses are political and of public relevance while others are 
distinctly private and nonpolitical. Therefore, Western 
democracies are able to tolerate much lawlessness without jeopar-
dizing the stability of the system. This generally held distinction 
between political and nonpolitical matters insulates the political 
heart of the system, the government itself, from the effects of most 
crime. While no criminal act is acceptable, some are less unaccept-
able than others. 
Stephen R. Bowers is a visiting professor at the School of International 
Studies, USAIMA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on leave from Berry 
College, Mount Berry, Georgia. 
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This convenient distinction between political and nonpolitical 
offenses is less apparent in Communist party states. In those 
systems, some offenses (most traffic violations, for example) are 
regarded as both nonpolitical and of no social significance, but 
because socialist theory eliminates so many distinctions between 
public and private behavior the scope of official concern is much 
greater than in the West and more offenses have political impact. 
Thus, a great many violations of law that do not carry the op-
probrium of a high political crime, such as treason, are never-
theless of considerable political significance. 
To examine the relationship between crime and regime stability, 
this paper will consider the incidence of crime in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) and official treatment of that issue. 
Selection of the GDR for such a study is useful because this nation 
is generally regarded as the most prosperous of the Communist 
party states, and the Socialist Unity Party's (SED) technologically 
adaptive policies seem to have produced a comfortable wedding of 
doctrinaire ideology and modern technical innovation. 
It is a fundamental contention of this paper that while 
lawlessness does not necessarily constitute a threat to the stability 
of a non-Communist state, it does pose such a menace to the 
socialist regime. The current relevance of this topic need not be 
based on the proposition that crime has increased in East Ger-
many, but on the simple fact of its persistence. 
The persistence of crime has a special meaning for a socialist 
state, one not produced in capitalist society. Because of the party's 
contention that criminal conduct will disappear when socialist con-
ditions prevail, law violations in socialist society raise an 
ideological problem. Marx wrote of the association of alienation 
with the appearance of private property and an antagonistic divi-
sion of labor. The alienation of man from nature and from other 
men was, in Marx's terms, a product of a class environment and 
feature of capitalism. Its most common manifestations were 
asocial behavior and criminal conduct, both of which were to 
disappear with a social evolution toward communism. Yet, in spite 
of the GDR's steady evolution toward full socialism, asocial 
behavior and criminal conduct still abound. Not only is 
lawlessness a feature of the GDR's socialist society, but it even 
assumes forms seen in nonsocialist nations. 
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Forms of Crime in the GDR 
Table 1 lists, in order of gravity, the socially unacceptable acts 
plaguing the GDR. Until recently the unavailability of data on 
crime made statistical analyses impossible. In 1978, however, of-
ficials published crime data in their statistical yearbook, the first 
such figures since 1970. Those figures were analyzed by Arnold 
Freiburg in an illuminating article in Deutschland-Archiv. 
Freiburg begins his examination by noting the SED's claims of a 
dramatic decline in crime, a decline documented by use of a per-
suasive "index figure" (1946 = 100). Today, according to the 
GDR's statisticians, crime is down to only 24.6 percent of what it 
was in the 1946-48 period. Bypassing official statistical surgery 
and discounting as questionable the use of figures from the 1940s 
(during which order was only loosely established), Freiburg con-
cludes that while the number of crimes has declined since the im-
mediate postwar years, that decline has been smaller than one 
would expect after the decriminalization of petty crimes in 1968 
(see Table 2 for his presentation of trends). In the 1970s, the 
number of persons convicted actually increased significantly after 
a decline in the 1960s. That increase is all the more remarkable 
since it came during a period of virtually zero population growth. 
This increase, in spite of tremendous educational and socialization 
efforts of the regime, must be especially disappointing. 
The locations of districts with greatest incidence of crime is 
another disquieting finding of these statistics. The places with the 
greatest problems, Berlin, FrankfurtiOder, Neubrandenburg, and 
Schwerin, are all in the north, the region with the youngest popula-
tion base in East Germany. According to Freiburg's study, the 
younger the population, the higher the number of criminal in-
cidents. Looking at the figures by category of offense, Freiburg 
identifies theft, fraud, and embezzlement as most significant, 
together constituting 50 percent of all crimes. Murder has held 
constant since 1969 while economic crime has gone down. On the 
other hand, robbery and blackmail are up drastically as is 
rowdyism, an offense generally associated with the young.! 
Among crimes, the attitudinal problems cited in the GDR media 
are taken most seriously, although they may appear trivial to the 
outsider. A 1978 article in Neue Justiz reflected the tone of general 
Volume 145, No.2 (Fall) 1982 
Table I.-Hierarchy of Asocial or Deviant Behavior Cited in Media 
Category 
1. Attitudinal 
shortcomings 
2. Minor misconduct or 
routine violations of 
social discipline 
3. Rowdyism 
4. Petty theft 
5. Serious 'white collar' 
crime 
6. Robbery and blackmail 
7. Serious violence 
Illustration 
arrogance, self-satisfaction, 
lack of discipline, unwillingness 
to work 
walking on lawns, violation of 
no-smoking rules, damage to 
public property 
beatings, defiance of FDJ patrols, 
public disturbances 
fraud, embezzlement by store clerks 
economic offenses 
extortion, burglary 
murder 
Table 2.-Freiburg's Presentation of GDR Crime Trend 
Crimes at annual average 
1960-1969: 100 
Offenders at annual average 
1960-1969: 100 
Convicted at annual average 
1960-1969: 100 
Placed before social courts 
at an annual average 
1960-1969: 100 
Convicted and placed before 
courts at an annual average 
1960-1969: 100 
1950-59 
157,466 
119 
76,953" 
139 
76,953 
100 
1960-69 
132,741 
100 
98,509 
100 
55,319b 
100 
21,816c 
100 
77,135 
100 
aup to and including 1954 without East Berlin. 
b1969 not included. 
<Prom 1961 to 1968 inclusively. 
1970-77 
124,206 
94 
94,254 
96 
62,030 
112 
23,351 
107 
85,381 
111 
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discussion of these problems with its references to contradictions 
in the social processes. Expanding this theme, the authors, Pro-
fessor Dr. Erich Buchholz and Dr. Irmgard Buchholz, both of 
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Humbolt University, declared that "imperialist influences" were 
evident in the exhibition by some young people of "manifestations 
of presumption and know-all, arrogance and intransigence."2 
Such people, suggested the authors, are not only unpleasant but, 
more importantly, likely future law offenders. 
The fate of arrogant youth, lacking enthusiasm for work, is 
presented in excessively grim terms by East German authorities. 
Dr. Lothar Reuter, the GDR's public prosecutor, described a 
"typical case" several years ago involving a youthful offender 
employed on a job less than four weeks in his entire life. Accord-
ing to Reuter, because of his unwillingness to work the young man 
finally ended up in court and was sent to prison. 3 
The youth's attitudinal shortcomings eventually led to "viola-
tions of social discipline," a more serious category of deviant 
behavior. This category of behavior was described in a 1978 Polish 
account of juvenile delinquency in the GDR: damage to school 
furniture, ruining of seats on buses, and general destructiveness 
for the sake of amusement are illustrations. 4 
Still another example used by East German sociologists is the ex-
cessive use of stimulants and tranquilizers in the GDR. During the 
past decade, consumption of psychopharmacological remedies by 
East Germans has increased 900 percent, a development which 
many view as an indication of social instability. 5 
Closely related to routine violations of social discipline is a widely 
discussed type of offense referred to as rowdyism, something 
westerners describe as juvenile delinquency. A typical case was the 
much publicized incident in 1979, involving two teenagers, aged 
seventeen and eighteen, who "threatened members of FDJ groups 
for the maintenance of order and . . . knocked one of them 
down." For this misconduct, the elder of the two drew a six-
month prison term and a 500-mark fine while the seventeen-year-
old was sentenced to eight weeks in a juvenile prison. 6 
Still more serious during this time of economic difficulties in the 
GDR are the numerous cases of petty theft, which generally in-
volve lone individuals driven by the desire to supplement their in-
comes by taking money or goods from the enterprises for which 
they work. Two well-publicized cases illustrate these activities: 
1) a part-time store clerk who withheld sales slips from customers 
so she could take the money herself after falsifying inventory 
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reports; and, 2) an employee of a chemical company who ac-
quired automotive tires, tubes, and "luxuries," such as hubcaps, 
by charging them to the enterprise. 7 
Sometimes thievery is on a grander, more systematic scale and 
consequently poses a threat to the national economy. The dimen-
sions of East German "white collar" crime were demonstrated by 
the 1976 convictions in Leipzig of almost every member of the 
work force and management of a canning plant for systematically 
diverting entire shipments of canned goods from the factory into 
their own black market operation. 8 Illegal building is another ex~ 
ample of this category of lawlessness, one which has even received 
a specific public denunciation by SED General Secretary 
Honecker. In 1979 the Schwerin Bezirk court sentenced a 
Mecklenburg mayor and four others to prison terms and fines for 
illegally building a holiday village of thirty bungalows, social 
buildings, and paved roads. Workers were recruited for this illegal 
project by the offer of higher wages than those given for projects 
associated with the kreis economic plan. The severe sentences 
given to the architects of this scheme were hailed as warnings to all 
officials. 9 Shortcomings in the GDR construction sector have also 
resulted in graft in some state housing administrations. In 1979 
Neues Deutschland reported sentences given to five administrators 
who had been taking bribes for improperly assigning new apart-
ments in Dessau. The five received prison sentences of up to five 
years and fines of as much as 50,000 marks. 10 
Perhaps even more disturbing to the SED is the frequency of 
robbery and violent crime. The harshest critics of Communist 
regimes have generally recognized the numerous security 
mechanisms of those states as sufficient to make the individual 
secure against robbery and physical violence. However, recent 
statistics and media attention attest to an increase in robberies and 
the persistence of homicide. An issue of Junge Welt, the Free Ger-
man Youth (FDJ) daily, drew attention to the case of a seventeen-
year-old boy, said to be the product of a "good" East German 
family, who robbed and beat a pregnant woman. 11 Publicity given 
to incidents of homicide, a "statistically imperceptible" matter in 
the tableau of East German crime, we are told, indicates official 
alarm even though such occurrences have not increased since 1969. 
One of the most discussed cases occurred in Magdeburg where a 
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twenty-year-old man was executed following his conviction for the 
murders of his teenage girlfriend, her roommate, and a young man 
visiting in their apartment. Reports of the crime were linked with 
demands for an exploration of organizational failure in dealing 
with the offender. 12 
Causes of Crime 
Recognizing that crime does exist in the GDR and that it is of 
significant dimensions, it is important to ascertain the reasons for 
its existence. Our distant location and restrictions on research in 
East Germany will not permit the sort of examination demanded 
for research on Western problems, but it is useful to at least ex-
amine official views. East German authorities' explanations fit 
within two basic approaches; one, apparently intended for popular 
consumption, rests on the proposition that pernicious capitalist in-
fluences alone are the productive factor while the other considers 
sophisticated ideological and scientific factors. The popular ap-
proach was enunciated by Chief Judge Joachim Schlegel of the 
GDR Supreme Court, who suggested: "There is a small group of 
young people who, above all under the influence of ideological 
diversion by the adversary, commit criminal acts and acts impair-
ing social life, such as hooliganism, aggression toward fellow 
citizens, disturbances of meetings, or disregard for public order 
and state authority." 13 Numerous other commentators echo and 
broaden this theme by emphasizing "moral damage" resulting 
from contacts with westerners, listening to popular Western 
music, and watching television programs from the FRG. 
Yet there is also an effort to explain criminality by considering 
more than "imperialist influences." These more recent endeavors 
have been encouraged by Humbolt University's criminal law 
authorities Walter Henning and John Lekschas. They maintain 
that while "imperialist influences" are a factor, criminality is also 
a product of "relics of an egoistic-individualistic, impulsive-
anarchistic nature" in the social environment of socialist society. 
This, they admit, is an apparent contradiction of the widely held 
belief that "with the complete evolution of communist social rela-
tionships . . . and communist personalities, criminality will be 
overcome. Communism and criminality are not only incompatible 
with one another, they exclude one another." 14 
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The key, we are assured, lies in the as-yet incomplete evolution 
of society. With the further development of socialist society, the 
relics of the old order will be identified and fully eliminated. 
Meanwhile, one may expect to see phenomena such as juvenile 
criminality even though the youth have never lived under 
capitalism and sometimes become criminals under conditions of a 
developed socialist society. Yet, it is important to note that 
criminality in socialist society is not a protest against prevailing 
conditions, as in capitalism, but merely the result of influences 
from imperialism and of relics from the old, exploitative society. It 
remains something that is foreign to the nature of socialism and 
will, with time and effort, be eradicated. 15 
A final interpretative element of lawlessness in socialist society is 
biological and psychological anomalies. The general conclusion 
regarding these factors is that they acquire special weight only in 
cases of insanity or near-insanity. Even then, their explanatory 
value applies only to individual cases and does not account for the 
overall phenomenon of crime. Biological and psychological fac-
tors, authorities believe, cannot produce a fatal predisposition to 
crime because the man-environment relationship is always the 
decisive element. Crime, even involving people suffering from 
biological or psychological anomalies, is socially determined. 16 
Official expositions on the causes of crime, though interesting, 
have much less explanatory value than alternative analyses offered 
by observers outside of party circles. Many of these views are 
founded on the proposition that crime is less a result of remnants 
of the old order than a product of socialist society itself. This con-
tention is a fundamental attack on the nature of 
socialism-especially the economic performance of the 
system-and underscores the grave ideological problem raised by 
the persistence of crime in the GDR. 
A Swedish journal advanced one such theme in a 1979 treatment 
of East German social problems. Considering the attitudes of the 
GDR's youth, author Richard Swartz suggested that large groups 
of young people have difficulty "finding their place" in East Ger-
many's "overpedagogical and regulated society." Widespread 
apathy, he wrote, now exists among youth as a "reaction against 
the guardianship of society ... and a political situation in which 
the opportunities of the individual citizen to participate and in-
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fluence his society are often reduced to pure ritual." 17 The failure 
of the economic system to offer sufficient compensations to offset 
limited political and social opportunities for young people un-
doubtedly underscores this sense of alienation. 
Lawlessness might also be attributed, at least in some cases, to 
simple boredom, an almost certain by-product of any planned, 
thoroughly regulated society. Sometimes the recalcitrance of 
bored youth takes relatively innocuous forms but official expres-
sions of concern have become more emphatic with reports of 
youthful prostitution and burglary. Incidents of this nature sug-
gest that the youth population is affected by cynicism so often 
viewed as peculiar to Western young people only. While there is no 
evidence that boredom and cynicism have produced a revolu-
tionary situation among the GDR's youth, it may be appropriate 
to speak of a "generation gap" of at least minor proportions. 
In addition, East German lawlessness might be viewed as part of 
what some analysts see as a generally declining popular morale. 
Although the most frequently cited symptom of what a West Ger-
man newspaper described as an "erosion of confidence" among 
the East German population 18 has been the large number of East 
German requests for resettlement in the Federal Republic, it is not 
unreasonable to view crime as still further evidence of this prob-
lem. Morale problems may be particularly evident in crimes with 
some economic significance-robbery, for example-during a 
time when Western goods, offered at high prices, have become 
more common in East German shops. Many nonsocialist critics are 
convinced that popular greed and envy rather than general con-
sumer satisfaction have been the products of Honecker's "goulash 
and jeans socialism." 19 VW Rabbits and West German salad dress-
ings have become not only the mark of success for the more for-
tunate East Germans but also, in the eyes of low-income citizens, 
evidence of the existence of a privileged "new class" in the GDR. 
An additional contributing factor, as much of the preceding 
suggests, may be the GDR's worsening economic situation. For 
several years the economy has been suffering from the impact of 
higher market prices for industrial raw materials as well as such 
consumer goods as coffee and cocoa. Increases in prices for these 
and many other items have led to shortages of hard currency, off-
set only in part by higher road customs for Western visitors and 
Volume 145, No.2 (Fall) 1982 161 
other ventures designed to bring in Western currencies. (In 1981, 
the minimum exchange amount for one-day visits to East Berlin 
was increased from 6.5 to 25 marks.) In the face of reduced sup-
plies of valued consumer goods, Honecker expanded the intershop 
system as a means of distributing Western products while soaking 
up convertible currencies. 20 Meanwhile, state-sanctioned corrup-
tion has begun to spread as citizens join in an effort to acquire 
non socialist bank notes by any means possible. Consequently, the 
skilled worker who used to perform after-hours chores for West 
German cigarettes or coffee now demands payment in West Ger-
man marks. In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that frustrated 
citizens lacking the required funds might turn to burglary. There 
are, of course, no data available to support or refute this conjecture. 
The SED's Anticrime Program 
The party's effort to combat crime is unique in its emphasis on 
attainment of the "proper ideological alignment." East German 
authorities have prefaced their summons to battle with an in-
sistence that the undertaking be given highest priority. "Order, 
discipline, and security," authorities declare, "is the most impor-
tant requirement for the further shaping of the developed socialist 
society." Development of "socialist democracy" requires that 
order and discipline be maintained not only in the early stages of 
societal evolution, but at every step of development. With this 
declaration, regime spokesmen remove the ideological basis for 
any eventual dismantling of the growing police apparatus. 21 
The socialist anticrime efforts, however, are not to be confused 
with those of capitalist nations. The latter, according to Professor 
Dr. Erich Buchholz, are confined to superficial measures and "at 
best include some preventive, welfare and social-educational pro-
visions." Basic social conditions, unaffected by those endeavors, 
are the primary focus of the socialist crime prevention program. 
Under socialism the "unity of crime prevention and crime fighting 
represents a necessary element in the organization of the Com-
munist system of society." 22 Thus, it is argued, the social con-
tradictions leading to crime are eliminated. 
A concentration on political and social factors as well as the 
purely criminal features of lawbreaking ensures attainment of the 
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proper ideological alignment. This, of course, is a departure from 
non-Communist police work but is a necessary concomitant of law 
enforcement in the SED's system. The Ministry of Interior began a 
full application of this concept in 1974 with an intensification of 
political-ideological training for detectives. 23 
In addition to its ideological component, the SED program con-
tains elements of permissiveness blended with the coercive 
characteristics normally associated with these undertakings. The 
permissive theme, evidently based on the assumption that at least 
some crime results from popular disaffection, includes, first, in-
creased attention to the general well-being of the population. 
Thus, attention has been called to a number of immediate short-
comings. some of which were summarized in a 1978 issue of Staat 
und Recht. According to Dr. Heidrun Pohl and Professor Dr. 
Gerhard Schulze, both of the GDR Academy of Political Science 
and Jurisprudence, some of the principal deficiencies are the slow 
processing of citizen petitions by communal authorities, the fact 
that citizens are not given concrete answers to petitions, and that 
certain requests are not confirmed at all. These failures, the 
authors observe, undermine confidence in the state and thereby 
I I . I· 24 promote a situation more favorab e to aw VlO atlOns. 
A second feature of the permissive theme, greater sensitivity to 
public opinion, was detailed by Drs. Gunter Schneider and Ewald 
Wachter, also associates of the Academy of Political Science and 
Jurisprudence. After citing state treatment of public opinion as the 
"weakest link" in the mastery of ideological processes and infor-
mational activity, Schneider and Wachter call for a more careful 
analysis of public opinion and an increased effort to ensure 
popular feedback regarding state programs. Success, in their view, 
will reduce popular discontent and help further establish the 
legitimacy of the SED's regime. According to their standard, 
"State public opinion work must ... contribute to the shaping and 
further development of a public opinion which is characterized in 
its ideological content by a conviction of the lawfulness of our vic-
tory and the superiority in principle of our social order. ... " 25 
An illustration of the permissive trend in action, it appears on 
first examination, is the 1979 amnesty declared by the GDR State 
Council to commemorate the nation's thirtieth anniversary. This 
amnesty, the fourth in a series which began in 1951, will eventually 
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cover 20,000 prisoners, 84 of whom are West German citizens 
scheduled to be returned to the FRG. Under amnesty terms, local 
authorities must find jobs for amnestied GDR citizens and assist in 
their reintegration into society. Individuals with records of 
previous convictions, in line with offical concern over the problem 
of recidivism, were not included in the amnesty. 26 The 
humanitarian nature of this action, however, has been challenged 
by critics who argue that a reduction in the number of prisoners 
was necessary simply to make room for new prisoners. A West 
German newspaper also suggested that this large amnesty, coming 
so recently after the 1972 amnesty, is proof of the severity of the 
East German penal system, because it indicates that the GDR's 
prison population is proportionately much larger than that of the 
Federal Republic. 27 
Crime prevention through education is an important component 
of the SED's program. This undertaking enlists homes, schools, 
and factories and takes as its starting point providing young people 
with an education in the "joys of work" so they will realize that 
work is an honor and a social duty. Factories contribute to promo-
tion of discipline by developing "socialist attitudes toward 
work. "28 Working on the assumption that a low educational level 
is a cause of youthful criminal behavior, in 1975 the GDR began to 
provide a ten-grade advanced education for inmates of juvenile 
prisons. The "educational value of socially useful labor" is also 
recognized by East German authorities and in 1974 they began ex-
tensive employment of convicts in factories throughout the nation. 
While some might see this as reminiscent of forced labor, 
authorities stress the educational value rather than the economic 
potential of the practice and emphasize that it is simply an element 
of "citizenship training" for prisoners. 29 
A more formal element of this approach is the law indoctrina-
tion and education program. Law indoctrination, in the SED's 
view "is always concerned with providing convictions and 
, . 
knowledge with respect to the pronouncements of MarXlsm-
Leninism on the state, law and democracy, and on the realization 
of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in real socialism, while 
simultaneously aggressively and valiantly carrying on the 
ideological dispute with imperialism in this field. "30 Specialists 
stress the requirement for a significant ideological impact in this 
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program and "law propagandists" are assigned the duty of "rais-
ing the ideological content ... and efficacy" of law indoctrina-
tion. The ideological conflict with imperialism rather than the per-
sistence of crime is offered as justification for an intensification of 
this effort. 
As law indoctrination endeavors are advanced with renewed fer-
vor, legal authorities remind party workers that previous educa-
tional programs have been inadequate. Drs. Erich and Irmgard 
Buchholz offered a very general view with their reference in 1978 
to "various contradictions in the educational process" relating to 
young people who have "difficulties with discipline." In their 
view, educational shortcomings may lead to mistakes in evaluating 
the ability and willingness of juvenile criminals to "adopt a more 
appropriate social conduct in the future."3! Numerous leaders of 
the academic community have identified specific failures of the 
GDR's educational program. The ideological and political content 
of educational instruction is a constant worry. Misgivings about 
this aspect of the GDR's efforts were expressed by Professor 
Gerhart Neuner, president of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences, 
who complained that students' knowledge about ideological and 
sociological interrelationships is superficial. Concepts, Neuner 
argues, are reduced to meaningless cliches in the minds of too 
many students.32 Another target of criticism is the liberalization 
trend apparent in some facets of the educational program of the 
GDR. Professor Dr. Adolf Kossakowski, director of the Institute 
for Pedagogic Psychology, has charged that "some of our 
students' behavioral problems which give us trouble in the schools, 
in the family, and in public life, must to a large extent be at-
tributed to an uncertainty about norms on the part of the public, 
the parents and some of the teachers and educators, as well as to 
an unjustified liberalization in regard to educational standards." 33 
Kossakowski's theme demonstrates the transition in policy from 
the permissive to the coercive, a transition in which he couples a 
call for consistency and uniformity in educational standards with 
demands for greater discipline among young people. 
Law indoctrination and education also involve the focusing of 
public attention on trial proceedings, apparently on the assump-
tion that pUblicity will have an educational effect. Official inten-
tions became obvious in 1979 as local newspapers began to publish 
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more accounts of criminal proceedings, especially those involving 
young people. Local publications, of course, are not generally 
available in the West, so their use offered the prospect of a limited 
audience, the East German population, which was to be the 
beneficiary of the lessons projected in the official proceedings. 
Another variation in the effort to bring details of trials to the 
public's attention is the practice of bringing an "expanded public" 
into the court. Thus in a 1979 case in Cottbus, six young people 
employed at the Cottbus slaughterhouse, charged with acting in 
disregard of public safety, were brought to trial within a matter of 
days in what were termed "accelerated proceedings," which were 
conducted at their place of work in the presence of fellow 
workers. 34 
Although not primarily an educational activity, punishment 
itself is also regarded as an educational tool. East German legal 
specialists emphasize the creation of situations in which the 
criminal is given the opportunity to prove himself and "thus meet 
his social responsibilities in the future." Certain types of punish-
ment are much more conducive to this than others, so preference is 
given to suspended sentences rather than imprisonment where 
possible, especially for juvenile offenders. The educational 
possiblities of this option are realized by giving the offender social 
responsibility. In view of the serious problem of recidivism in the 
GDR, it is clear that authorities do take the educational function 
of punishment seriously. Their recognition of the limits of penal 
law as an educational device is reflected in pronouncements that 
the process of reeducation is an overall social task shared by many 
public and private institutions. Accordingly, numerous agencies 
without direct connections to the penal system-youth organiza-
tions, unions, schools, and the family-are called upon to aid in 
the rehabilitation of criminals. 35 
An examination of these educational programs gives a good in-
dication of the special concerns of the nation's leadership. The 
themes that most clearly emerge show that the SED is troubled by 
youth criminality, recidivism, and crimes against property. The 
latter especially demonstrates the crucial role of economic pros-
perity as a basis of legitimacy for the SED's regime, a fact about 
which there has been much comment by Western analysts. 36 Ero-
sion of the economic basis for East German stability would have 
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dramatic consequences that would likely be reflected in crimes 
against property. The numerous expressions of alarm about the 
seriousness of this category of offense indicate that such an ero-
sion may now be taking place. 
Going beyond educational efforts, officials also detail a series of 
directly preventive measures to deter crime by both juveniles and 
adults. In December of 1978, the GDR Supreme Court outlined 
goals and tasks in the effort to combat crime, especially among 
young people. An improvement in criminal proceedings, relative 
to both legal instruments as well as social forces, is one of the first 
points cited. Equally important, in the court's view, is the "strug-
gle" to keep young people from coming into contact with "hostile, 
demoralizing, and criminal influences."37 The latter measure is 
particularly relevant to the effort to prevent rather than simply 
punish crime. Helmut Nedwig, chief of the Main Department for 
Criminal Police, echoed this theme in 1979 as he urged 
criminologists to direct their main efforts toward prevention of 
crimes, especially those against the economy and socialist and per-
sonal property. Nedwig, expressing official dissatisfaction about 
techniques being employed, demanded an improvement in the 
analytical work of the criminal police. 38 
The preventive effort also centers on a call for reinforcement of 
public confidence. According to SED statements, public con-
fidence would be strengthened by improvement of the political and 
economic bases of the socialist social and state system. Popular 
confidence in the law and maintenance of law, SED legal 
specialists argue, is possible only as citizens are assured that their 
socialist lifestyle will be protected. As with previous facets of the 
SED anticrime program, the protection of socialist property 
receives specific attention. The protection and augmentation of 
socialist property, we are told, represents the "vital basis for the 
improvement of the people's material and cultural standard of liv-
ing." 39 The utility of this approach becomes obvious if one accepts 
the proposition that crimes against property cause the SED its 
greatest anxiety today. 
Encouragement of popular participation in law enforcement ac-
tivities is another facet of the GDR's preventive effort. The most 
evident expression of popular participation is the voluntary 
assistance force which supplements the People's Police. After 
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twenty-five years in operation, this organization boasts over 
100,000 citizens who are regularly involved in supporting the work 
of the People's Police. The emphasis of their work is on the 
prevention of crimes and the elimination of the causes and condi-
tions promoting crime outside the major cities. 40 The desire for 
popular participation manifests itself most often in discussions 
about juvenile crime. According to Drs. Roland Muller and 
Lothar Reuter, attorneys with the General Prosecuting Attorney's 
Office, "one of the most important considerations" in the preven-
tion of juvenile delinquency is that juveniles themselves should ac-
tively cooperate in crime prevention. Young people who choose to 
do so generally work with the Youth Help organization, a party-
sponsored group responsible for prevention of juvenile delin-
quency.41 Finally, citizens are reminded of their obligations to pre-
vent conditions conducive to crime. One trial account, for exam-
ple, concluded with a cautionary note against keeping large 
amounts of cash or expensive liquor at home. Yet, in spite of all 
that is being done to enlist popular participation, no official com-
placency is evident. The GDR's prosecutor general, Dr. Josef 
Streit, has demanded that "the working people's participation in 
crime fighting" must become "still more effective. ,,42 
Where preventive efforts do not succeed, there is, of course, the 
alternative of punitive measures to be taken against offenders. 
Table 3 presents common punishments for specified crimes. The 
most common, in the case of juveniles, is the probationary 
sentence. The advantage of this sentence, with its broad oppor-
tunities for education of the offender, is that it gives the young 
person who has gotten into trouble the opportunity to prove 
himself in school or at his place of work. Probationary sentences 
and fines are also imposed as punishments for relatively minor of-
fenses. Restitution is another common punitive device used most 
frequently when a criminal act has occurred in conjunction with a 
"negative attitude toward work." Work without pay enables the 
individual to compensate for the misdeed while also learning from 
his mistake. 43 
In contrast with the leniency implied by these measures, 
authorities are willing to impose more severe penalties in an in-
creasing number of cases. In 1979 the Supreme Court asked all 
lower courts to punish crimes against property, especially socialist 
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Table 3.-The Range of Punishments in the GDR 
Category of Offense 
Attitudinal 
shortcomings 
Minor misconduct or routine 
violations of social 
discipline 
Rowdyism 
Petty theft 
Serious 'white collar' 
crime 
Robbery and blackmail 
Serious violence 
Most Frequent Sanctions 
public reprimand, organizational 
'missionary' work, probation 
public reprimand, organizational 
'missionary' work, fines, 
restitution, probation 
public reprimand, organizational 
'missionary' work, fines, 
restitution, limited personal 
restrictions, short prison terms 
fines, short or medium prison 
terms, restitution 
medium prison terms 
medium prison terms 
medium or long prison terms, 
execution 
property, more severely. The court demanded that this apply with 
special force to more serious crimes as well as those committed by 
recidivists. Moreover, punishment is not to be made primarily 
dependent upon how much damage was caused but equally upon 
the attitude and motives of the offender. Crimes prompted by 
greed, wastefulness, the pursuit of lUXury items, or the desire to 
lead an extravagant life-style must, according to the court, be 
punished most harshly. 44 The increasingly severe sentences being 
meted out for roWdyism is another reflection of the view that le-
niency is not always appropriate. After courts sentenced over a 
dozen young people to prison terms of up to fourteen months as 
punishment for damaging a train while celebrating the outcome of 
a soccer match in 1978, the SED paper Markische Volksstime 
warned that the "full harshness of our socialist laws" would be ap-
plied to such people in the future. "Velvet gloves," the paper 
editorialized, will not be used, because working people have the 
right to expect "decisive and unambiguous reactions from the 
organs of justice and security" when rowdies destroy public prop-
erty and endanger public order and security. 45 
Volume 145, No.2 (Fall) 1982 169 
The assignment of sentences, it should be noted, reflects an em-
phasis upon ideological considerations. Dr. Erich Buchholz, 
writing of the needs of a "scientific doctrine on sentencing," sug-
gests that a proper understanding of the social development of the 
nation results in sentences which take into account the social ef-
fects of the crime. 46 If those sentences become more severe, it is a 
response to the seriousness with which the criminal actions are 
viewed and a recognition of their total societal impact. 
The trend toward more stringent repression of violations of 
"social discipline" has even spread to the GDR's universities. The 
new disciplinary rules, effective with the 1977178 academic year, 
revealed the breadth of official efforts. The new rules, while ex-
panding certain student rights, tightened disciplinary procedures 
considerably. The objectives of the new regulations are to 
strengthen the legal consciousness and politico-moral behavior of 
students; to promote a greater consciousness of responsibility 
among students; and to remove the politico-ideological causes of 
"erroneous" behavior. Responsibilities of the FDJ for ac-
complishment of these objectives were greatly expanded and 
students also assumed greater "material responsibility" for any 
damage to property in the course of their student lives. 47 
The most extensive moves in this direction came in 1979 with 
passage by the Volkskammer of the so-called "third criminal 
amendment" and other new legal provisions. As a result of the 
Volkskammer's actions, the GDR's authorities have "more op-
portunities to prevent criminal actions," "attacks" on the SED's 
system will be "more effectively prevented," public order is 
generally strengthened, police have "wider possibilities" for secur-
ing evidence, and customs and foreign exchange regulations are 
expanded. In announcing introduction of this legislation, the SED 
daily Neues Deutschland asserted that the GDR is "one of the 
safest countries on earth." Justification for the tighter laws is based 
not on an increase in crime, but on the need to respond to "in-
creased sabotage and agitation against the GDR and its citizens." 
The source of this threat is presumably the capitalist West, for, as 
Neues Deutschland observes, "it must naturally be taken into con-
sideration that the GDR is situated at the juncture of the two large 
social systems. "48 
A blurring of the distinctions between political and nonpolitical 
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offenses becomes even more obvious after examination of the 
security provisions of this legislation. These ~e~s~res refor~u~ate 
the concept of espionage and broaden the defmltlon of a cnmmal 
act in such a way as to label oppositional forces as common 
criminals. This is not a new approach but simply a recent 
manifestation of an official East German tendency to find political 
implications in ordinary cases, something which ?tto Kirch.heimer 
noted in his Political Justice two decades ago. 4, MeanwhIle, the 
minimum penalty for criticizing the GDR's political system or 
authorities in public has been increased from two to three years' 
imprisonment. "Antistate incitement,': more serious. but closely 
related to public criticism, is made pumshable by a pnson term of 
at least eight years, up from five years. 50 
An eniargement of military-security-criminal functions is 
another manifestation of the tendency to merge criminal and 
political law enforcement. The expansion of the jurisdiction of 
miiitary courts in 1979 signaled a move to give the milit~ry 
authorities new responsibilities in law enforcement. Effectlve 
August 1, 1979, pursuant to a regulation passed by the National 
Defense Council, civilian employees of the National People's 
Army, the GDR Border Troops, civil defense and alternative 
military service organizations may be tried in military instead of 
civilian courts. 51 Shortly afterward, the Council of Ministers issued 
a decree extending the military obligations of citizens and enter-
prises. According to the decree, which took effect on October 1, 
1979, in time of peace enterprises and cooperatives can be required 
to provide vehicles, machines, and spare parts for the military, and 
civilians are obligated to "render services" requested by the 
military. 52 As the East German national defense law was being 
amended, the National Defense Council gave SED General 
Secretary Honecker much broader, sweeping authority in the 
military sphere. Honecker's military role was further bolstered by 
the appointment of his close confidant, Lt. Gen. Fritz Streletz, as 
Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army. 53 
Conclusion 
An examination of the SED's approach to crime over the past 
few years supports several observations. The most obvious 
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presented by available data is that official expectations have been 
scaled down from that earlier time when Marxist prophets saw an 
almost total elimination of criminality with the development of an 
advanced socialist society. A more realistic assessment prevails to-
day as East German authorities simply speak of a "constant 
decrease of crime in the socialist states." 54 Yet, the persistence of 
criminal behavior has not resulted in application of the Draconian 
measures of which a state such as the GDR is capable. Granted, 
coercive measures have been intensified in some cases, but there 
has also been an increased emphasis on more positive educational 
programs and on improving responsiveness to public opinion. In 
short, there has been a comfortable blending of somewhat per-· 
missive or "liberal" elements with coercive force. 
Retention of a strong ideological emphasis has been part of the 
"liberal" aspect of the SED's program. The ideological concentra-
tion appears first in the party's examination of the causes of crime. 
Lack of adequate ideological emphasis is repeatedly cited as a 
primary contributing factor in the persistence of crime. Official 
concern for the class basis of the fight against crime is reflected in 
party pronouncements on the necessity of viewing lawlessness as a 
social phenomenon rather than an individual manifestation of de-
viance. This has not prevented extensive efforts to battle in-
dividual acts, but it does demonstrate the SED's continuing desire 
to maintain the proper ideological alignment. This orientation is 
also developed by the popular legal-educational programs as well 
as the ideological training required for East German detectives. 
While the range of criminal activities in the GDR covers the 
spectrum of what one might expect in the West, official attention 
is drawn to several key difficulties. The primary concerns, in the 
SED's view, are the rising number of property crimes, the increase 
in juvenile delinquency, and the high rate of recidivism. The prob-
lem of offenses against property is demonstrated by the numerous 
public statements demanding greater respect for property. 
With mounting economic woes facing the GDR in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, crimes against property clearly occupied first 
place in official consciousness. Lack of respect for socialist prop-
erty raises a special question, since it reveals a fundamental lack of 
appreciation for the concept of socialist order. The preoccupation 
with juvenile crime fell close behind in the SED's efforts while 
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recidivism has received somewhat less attention. But, as restric-
tions on the most recent amnesty indicate, the latter is viewed 
as a serious shortcoming. Stress on the educational function of 
punishment is yet another reflection of this perception. 
A final observation is in order regarding the economic impact of 
crime. The expansion of the customs and foreign exchange regula-
tions in 1979 and 1981 underscores the effort to provide greater 
protection of economic assets. Taken together with more extensive 
measures to prevent crimes against property. this action provides a 
convincing picture of an East Germany very much concerned 
about its economic well-being. The close relationship between 
prosperity and political stability in most societies has long been 
recognized generally and there is no reason why the SED's leader-
ship should not share this perception. It must also realize that the 
popular perspectives of the 1980s are very different from those of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Expectations of this decade will be based on a 
much more demanding frame of reference than during earlier 
periods. As a result, the regime's economic output must satisfy an 
increasingly demanding and, by East European standards, very 
sophisticated buying public. Therefore, the economic dimension 
of crime may be the most significant aspect of this phenomenon 
and could have by far the most dramatic impact on the stability of 
the regime. In this respect, the case of the GDR is not unique in 
Eastern Europe. As both Juviler and Shelley note in their studies, 
it is economic crimes that occur with greatest frequency 
throughout the USSR and the other Communist party states of the 
region. In fact, as Shelley states, the proportion of crimes against 
property as compared with those against the person rises steadily 
as the nation becomes more industrialized. 55 East Germany, of 
course, is among the most advanced states of Eastern 5urope in 
terms of its industrialization. 
The extent to which crime affects regime stability in the GDR is 
further conditioned by official perceptions of the significance of 
crime. In the West, criminal behavior is generally regarded as aber-
rant and not representative of a threat to the legitimacy of social 
norms. The aberrant individual merely attempts to "beat the 
system"; he does not formally reject the values of the system. His 
actions, of course, are seen as an individual problem. Given the 
all-embracing, totalist nature of the GDR's social and political 
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system, no such view can gain official acceptance. The SED's 
ideologically colored outlook mandates a conception under which 
crime signifies, ultimately, rejection of regime-sanctioned values. 
This is the essence of the belief that all lawlessness has social roots. 
The suggestion that imperialist influences trigger criminality only 
partially obscures this conclusion. If nothing else, authorities must 
come to grips with the fact of socialist society's receptivity to 
hostile influences. 
At the core of this problem is the party's inability to make ex-
plicit distinctions between public and private behavior, a weakness 
inherent in almost all Communist party states. The broad socialist 
definition of society makes this weakness unavoidable. The legal 
provisions introduced in 1979, the "third criminal amendment" 
and others, accelerated the process of abolishing legal distinctions 
between public and private behavior and, concomitantly, between 
political and nonpolitical offenses. Official ability and inclination 
to distinguish between what constitutes an offense against private 
interest as opposed to public interest has been diminished by adop-
tion of the new regulations. In light of the ideological foundations 
of the SED's order, these developments should not surprise 
observers. If surprise is expressed, it should be at the delay in im-
posing formal legal conceptions of this nature. 
Nonetheless, lawlessness in the GDR remains essentially 
nonrevolutionary. Objectively, one should not depict it as shaking 
the foundation stones of the regime. Yet, this nonrevolutionary 
behavior may have a revolutionary impact. The SED strives to 
restrict this impact and, in some respects, seems to have ac-
complished much through its efforts. This is most obvious where 
direct repression is applied through police measures and wider use 
of military authority. In these cases party control is strictly main-
tained so there is no likelihood that the police/security apparatus 
will overshadow the SED. This was clearly demonstrated by 
enlargement of Honecker's military role and the requirement that 
police officers intensify the ideological basis of their work, thereby 
sharpening party direction of their work. 
Adoption of the "permissive" approach, however, raises ques-
tions about the SED's ability to retain control over all conse-
quences of its programs. The emphasis on greater responsiveness 
to public opinion and the effort to achieve more popular feedback 
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regarding state programs illustrate the drift toward liberalization 
of the system. The record of East European regimes experiencing 
the liberalization process is uninspiring. Some, Poland for exam-
ple, have adapted themselves and maintained stability for a time. 
Polish developments of 1980-82, however, demonstrated the limits 
of the Polish experiment. Others, such as Hungary in 1956 and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, have fared even less well. Eventually, in 
all of these nations, the process simply could not be controlled and 
generated demands exceeding the capacity of the system. In the 
East German case, it is not unreasonable to suggest that liberaliza-
tion, taking place in what has so recently been a rigid and 
repressive society, might result in a severe shock to the stability of 
the SED's order, at least in the short run. On the other hand, it is 
possible that a relaxation of this nature might enhance the GDR's 
long-range prospects for endurance if it gets beyond the initial 
shock stage. 
Even in the absence of such an opening-up of the East German 
system, the conclusion that crime will have a direct impact on the 
regime's stability is inescapable. The foregoing examination of 
crime has been made within the framework of a Marxist perspec-
tive, one which the SED consistently applies in its own analyses. 
Unfortunately, as the author of a recent study on deviance in 
Eastern Europe observed, "Marxist theory makes deviance seem 
much more perilous for regime stability." Whereas Western 
theories allow that "deviance may be functional" to a society, the 
Marxist world view does not. The GDR must, nonetheless, be 
judged by the demanding principles it has embraced. The resultant 
lesson may be most instructive because, as the scholar above has 
concluded, "regimes which are failures according to their own 
ideological principles seldom retain either legitimacy or power in 
the long run. "56 
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Guyana: Changes in Ideology 
and Foreign Policy 
RALPH R. PREMDAS 
U ntil recently, the People's National Congress (PNC) government in Guyana, led by President Forbes Burnham, 
projected an image asserting socialism as its ideological guide. In 
the early 1970s, the Jose Marti award, Cuba's highest honor, was 
conferred on Burnham, and during Mao Zedong's regime the 
Guyanese president was welcomed in the People's Republic of 
China as a fellow comrade. Progressive-to-radical leaders of the 
third world, including Castro, Mrs. Bandarnaike, Sekou Toure, 
Julius Nyerere, and Mrs. Gandhi were invited to Guyana to 
witness the socialist transformation transpiring there. The main 
foreign companies were nationalized, bringing 80 percent of the 
country's economy under government control. 
This radical image was carefully cultivated for nearly a decade, 
from 1969 to 1978, and it reflects Burnham's earlier position dur-
ing the first phase of Guyana's independence movement. Burnham 
had allied himself with socialism from 1950 to 1964, as the country 
sought independence from British control. 
When Burnham first acceded to the leadership of Guyana in 
1964, however, he headed a regime that was pro-Western and 
capitalist in orientation. Burnham had ousted his former coalition 
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